ABSTRACT

Different types of government subsidies are used to promote green technology innovation in many countries. Driven by government subsidies and consumer green preference, it’s common for manufacturers (the marketer) to cooperate with research institutes (the innovator) in green technology research and development (R&D). Managing R&D collaboration under different government subsidies is a challenge for the marketer. Meanwhile, how can the government design the subsidy policies to achieve a better effect is also vital. Thus, a two-level three-player game is proposed. The upper layer is the government's decision on R&D subsidy or per-unit production subsidy, and the lower layer is a principal-agent model composed of a marketer and an innovator, who cooperate simply or deeply with a contract with or without milestone payment. We find that: (a) It is always advantageous for the marketer to offer a milestone payment after successful R&D; (b) Deep R&D cooperation is more profitable for the marketer; (c) R&D subsidy is better at stimulating the environmental performance of green technology cooperation.

摘要

许多国家使用不同类型的政府补贴来促进绿色技术创新。在政府补贴和消费者绿色偏好的推动下，制造商（营销者）与研究机构（创新者）合作进行绿色技术研发（R&D）是很常见的。管理不同政府补贴下的研发合作对营销人员来说是一个挑战。同时，政府如何设计补贴政策以达到更好的效果也至关重要。因此，提出了一种两级三人游戏。上层是政府对研发补贴或单位生产补贴的决定，下层是由营销人员和创新者组成的委托代理模式，他们通过或不通过里程碑付款的合同进行简单或深度合作。我们发现： (a) 营销人员在研发成功后提供里程碑付款总是有利的；(b) 深度研发合作对营销人员来说更有利可图；(c) 研发补贴更能刺激绿色科技合作的环保表现。