To investigate the impact of the strategic operation of grid-level energy storage systems on wholesale electricity markets, we study a Cournot competition model where each merchant storage owner seeks to maximize its own profit and the social planner makes the centralized economic dispatch decisions to maximize the social welfare. We establish the existence and uniqueness of the resulting (Cournot) equilibrium, and construct a convex optimization problem that yields the unique Cournot equilibrium. We show that the social welfare achieved at the equilibrium is always no less than that achieved in a market without energy storage. We further show that the social welfare achieved at the equilibrium converges to the maximum social welfare, as the number of symmetric (profit-maximizing) storage owners increases to infinity. Numerical experiments are conducted on the IEEE RTS-24 bus test system to validate established results.

中文翻译：

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电力批发市场的战略存储运营：网络古诺博弈分析


为了研究电网级储能系统的战略运营对批发电力市场的影响，我们研究了古诺竞争模型，其中每个商业储能所有者都寻求自身利润最大化，社会规划者做出集中的经济调度决策以最大化社会福利。我们建立了所得（古诺）均衡的存在性和唯一性，并构造了一个产生唯一古诺均衡的凸优化问题。我们证明，在均衡时实现的社会福利始终不低于在没有储能的市场中实现的社会福利。我们进一步表明，随着对称（利润最大化）存储所有者的数量增加到无穷大，均衡时实现的社会福利收敛于最大社会福利。在IEEE RTS-24总线测试系统上进行了数值实验来验证所建立的结果。