The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is infamous for its structural adjustment programs, requiring countries to undertake policy reforms in exchange for loans. Yet, not only do countries routinely fail to implement these reforms, but they also frequently return to the IMF to start the process anew. What explains this compelling case of transnational regulatory ineffectiveness? We argue that countries are caught in a dependency trap: politically contentious policy prescriptions drive non-compliance, triggering adverse market reactions that leave countries with few sources of financing beyond the IMF, leading to their eventual return to the doors of the organization for a fresh loan. Using new data on 763 IMF programs from 1980 to 2015, we initially demonstrate that the prevalence of market-liberalizing structural reforms increases the likelihood of program interruptions. We then show that program interruptions undermine investor confidence and increase sovereign borrowing costs. Our study uncovers hitherto neglected relationships between the international institutions of regulatory capitalism, country compliance, and financial market responses.

中文翻译：

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合规、反抗和依赖陷阱：国际货币基金组织项目中断及其对资本市场的影响

国际货币基金组织（IMF）因其结构调整计划而臭名昭著，要求各国进行政策改革以换取贷款。然而，各国不仅经常未能实施这些改革，而且还经常回到 IMF 重新开始这一进程。是什么解释了这种令人信服的跨国监管无效案例？我们认为，各国陷入了依赖陷阱：政治上有争议的政策处方导致违约，引发不利的市场反应，使国家在国际货币基金组织之外几乎没有融资来源，最终导致它们重返该组织的大门，寻求新的贷款。使用 1980 年至 2015 年 763 个 IMF 项目的新数据，我们最初证明，市场自由化结构改革的盛行增加了项目中断的可能性。然后，我们表明计划中断会削弱投资者的信心并增加主权借贷成本。我们的研究揭示了迄今为止被忽视的国际资本主义监管机构、国家合规性和金融市场反应之间的关系。