We commonly appeal to emotions to explain human behaviour: we seek comfort out of grief, we threaten someone in anger and we hide in fear. According to the standard Humean analysis, intentional action is always explained with reference to a belief-desire pair. According to recent consensus, however, emotions have independent motivating force apart from beliefs and desires, and supplant them when explaining emotional action. In this paper I provide a systematic framework for thinking about the motivational structure of emotion and show how it is consistent with the Humean analysis. On this picture, emotions are not reducible to beliefs and desires, instead their primary motivational force comes from their role as modulators of desires—they control the strength of our occurrent desires. Emotions therefore motivate actions through the belief-desire system instead of overriding it.

我们通常用情感来解释人类行为：我们从悲伤中寻求安慰，我们在愤怒中威胁某人，我们在恐惧中隐藏。根据标准的休谟分析，故意行为总是参考信念-欲望对来解释。然而，根据最近的共识，情感除了信念和欲望之外，还有独立的驱动力，并在解释情感行为时取而代之。在这篇论文中，我提供了一个思考情绪动机结构的系统框架，并展示了它如何与 Humean 分析相一致。在这张图上，情绪不能还原为信念和欲望，相反，它们的主要动力来自它们作为欲望调节器的作用——它们控制着我们发生的欲望的强度。