Wordly internalists claim that while internal duplicates always share the same evidence, our evidence includes non-trivial propositions about our environment. It follows that some evidence is false. Worldly internalism is thought to provide a more satisfying answer to scepticism than classical internalist views that deny that these propositions about our environment might belong to our evidence and to provide a generally more attractive account of rationality and reasons for belief. We argue that worldly internalism faces serious difficulties and that its apparent advantages are illusory. First, it cannot adequately handle some not terribly strange cases of perceptual error. Second, it cannot explain why one should plan to use their evidence to update their beliefs. The second issue allows us to explain why cases of misplaced certainty do not require us to introduce false evidence into our views and that why the alleged advantage of worldly internalism in resisting sceptical pressures is illusory.

字面上的内在主义者声称，虽然内部重复总是共享相同的证据，但我们的证据包括关于我们环境的非平凡命题。因此，某些证据是错误的。世俗的内在主义被认为比经典的内在主义观点对怀疑论提供了更令人满意的答案，后者否认这些关于我们环境的命题可能属于我们的证据，并提供了对理性和信念理由的一般更具吸引力的解释。我们认为，世俗的内在主义面临着严重的困难，其明显的优势是虚幻的。首先，它不能充分处理一些不太奇怪的感知错误案例。其次，它无法解释为什么人们应该计划使用他们的证据来更新他们的信念。