We investigate the corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance of firms with a dual-class share structure. Dual-class firms, which represent a fast-growing segment of the U.S. capital market, violate the "one share, one vote" principle by giving corporate insiders control in excess of their economic interest in the firm. We observe a negative association of excess insider control and firms’ CSR performance, primarily with respect to the community- and employee-related dimensions of CSR. Extended analyses reveal that this negative association is mitigated by high financial resource availability. Consistent with a trade-off between corporate spending on CSR or on benefits for insiders, we also observe a negative association between CSR performance and executive pay in dual-class firms. Taken together, these extended analyses are consistent with self-interested behavior of entrenched insiders who, unless resources are abundant, appear to reduce CSR activities to maintain resources available for their personal benefit. While the exposure to risks engendered by a dual-class equity structure may be reflected in the share price, our findings draw attention to an externality: diminished CSR performance affects not just shareholders, but all stakeholders.

我们调查了具有双重股权结构的公司的企业社会责任 (CSR) 绩效。代表美国资本市场快速增长的部分的双重股权公司违反了“一股一票”的原则，授予公司内部人员超出其在公司中的经济利益的控制权。我们观察到过度的内部人控制与公司的 CSR 绩效之间存在负相关，主要是在与社区和员工相关的 CSR 方面。扩展分析表明，这种负面关联可以通过高财务资源可用性得到缓解。与企业在 CSR 上的支出或内部人员福利之间的权衡一致，我们还观察到双类公司的 CSR 绩效与高管薪酬之间存在负相关。综合起来，这些扩展分析与根深蒂固的内部人士的自利行为是一致的，除非资源充足，否则他们似乎会减少 CSR 活动以维持可用于个人利益的资源。虽然双层股权结构所带来的风险暴露可能会反映在股价中，但我们的研究结果引起了对外部性的关注：企业社会责任绩效下降不仅影响股东，而且影响所有利益相关者。