Since the introduction of the 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) regime, North Sea coastal states have cooperated in the management of shared stocks. Norway and the EU have jointly managed six shared stocks through the 1980 Agreement which includes the annual setting of total allowable catch quotas (TACs), quota shares and access agreements. This article first attempts to explain in a game theoretic context why cooperative management of shared North Sea fish stocks has been stable for more than 40 years. Brexit represented a shock to the cooperative agreement, and there are now three parties to the negotiations. The UK EEZ is important not only for British fishermen, but also for Norway and the EU27. The UK and the EU have agreed on a Trade and Cooperation Agreement which includes fisheries, but Norway and the UK have not yet reached a fisheries agreement. In the second part of the article we analyse the UK-EU fisheries agreement, the continuation of the 1980 Agreement, and the future fisheries relationship between the UK and Norway.

自从引入 200 海里专属经济区 (EEZ) 制度以来，北海沿岸国家在共享资源管理方面进行了合作。挪威和欧盟通过 1980 年协议共同管理了六种共享种群，其中包括年度总允许捕捞配额 (TAC)、配额份额和准入协议。本文首先尝试在博弈论的背景下解释为什么共享北海鱼类资源的合作管理在 40 多年来一直保持稳定。英国脱欧对合作协议造成了冲击，现在谈判有三方。英国专属经济区不仅对英国渔民很重要，对挪威和欧盟 27 国也很重要。英国和欧盟已达成贸易与合作协议，其中包括渔业、但挪威和英国尚未达成渔业协议。在文章的第二部分，我们分析了英国-欧盟渔业协定、1980 年协定的延续以及英国和挪威之间未来的渔业关系。