Election violence varies significantly within countries, yet how and why are undertheorized. Although existing scholarship has shown how national-level economic, institutional, and contextual factors increase a country's risk for violence during elections, these studies cannot explain why elites organize election violence in some localities but not others. An analysis of gubernatorial elections in Nigeria reveals the conditions under which elites recruit popular social-movement actors for pre-election violence. Gubernatorial elections are intensely competitive when agreements between governors and local ruling party elites over the distribution of state patronage break down. To oust their rivals and consolidate power, elites recruit popular reformist groups for pre-election violence and voter mobilization. Conversely, when local ruling-party elites are aligned over how state patronage is to be distributed, the election outcome is agreed to well in advance. In this scenario, there is little incentive to enlist social movement actors for violence. Case studies of the Ijaw Youth Council and Boko Haram provide empirical support for the argument. The theory and evidence help explain subnational variation in election violence as well as the relationship between intraparty politics and violence during elections, and speak to broader questions about political order and violence.

中文翻译：

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尼日利亚的精英竞争、社会运动和选举暴力

各国内部的选举暴力差异很大，但如何以及为什么存在理论不足。尽管现有的学术研究表明国家层面的经济、制度和背景因素如何增加一个国家在选举期间发生暴力的风险，但这些研究无法解释为什么精英在某些地方组织选举暴力，而在其他地方则不然。对尼日利亚州长选举的分析揭示了精英招募受欢迎的社会运动参与者进行选举前暴力活动的条件。当州长和地方执政党精英之间关于国家赞助分配的协议破裂时，州长选举竞争激烈。为了赶走对手并巩固权力，精英们招募受欢迎的改革派团体进行选举前的暴力和选民动员。反过来，当地方执政党精英就如何分配国家赞助达成一致时，选举结果就会提前达成一致。在这种情况下，几乎没有动力招募社会运动参与者参与暴力。Ijaw 青年委员会和博科圣地的案例研究为该论点提供了实证支持。理论和证据有助于解释选举暴力的次国家差异以及党内政治与选举期间暴力之间的关系，并讨论有关政治秩序和暴力的更广泛问题。Ijaw 青年委员会和博科圣地的案例研究为该论点提供了实证支持。理论和证据有助于解释选举暴力的次国家差异以及党内政治与选举期间暴力之间的关系，并讨论有关政治秩序和暴力的更广泛问题。Ijaw 青年委员会和博科圣地的案例研究为该论点提供了实证支持。理论和证据有助于解释选举暴力的次国家差异以及党内政治与选举期间暴力之间的关系，并讨论有关政治秩序和暴力的更广泛问题。