Several philosophers of science claim that scientific toy models afford knowledge of possibility, but answers to the question of why toy models can be expected to competently play this role are scarce. The main line of reply is that toy models support possibility claims insofar as they are credible. I raise a challenge for this credibility-thesis, drawing on a familiar problem for imagination-based modal epistemologies, and argue that it remains unanswered in the current literature. The credibility-thesis has a long way to go if it is to account for the epistemic merits of toy models.

中文翻译：

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可信度是可能性的指南吗？科学玩具模型的挑战

几位科学哲学家声称，科学玩具模型提供了关于可能性的知识，但是对于为什么玩具模型可以被期望胜任这一角色的问题的答案却很少。主要的回答是玩具模型支持可能性声明，只要它们是可信的。我针对基于想象的模态认识论的一个熟悉问题提出了对这个可信度论文的挑战，并认为它在当前的文献中仍未得到解答。如果要解释玩具模型的认知价值，可信度论题还有很长的路要走。