In 2010, the Northeast U.S. sink gillnet fleet faced threats of indefinite closures to fishing if compliance rates with acoustic deterrent devices did not increase. Simultaneously, a catch share program with multiple “sectors” was implemented for groundfish, an important target for this fleet. This research examines whether the threat of closures, the transition to sectors, or both, influenced the increased compliance rate after 2010. We learned in focus groups [9], that some fishers left off one pinger for safety reasons. A multinomial logit model using deterrent (perceived likelihood of the detection of non-compliance), economic, and normative (social, cultural, legitimacy) factors was developed to understand three responses: full compliance, non-compliance (multiple pingers missing), and non-compliance presumed to be related to safety (single pinger missing). At-sea observers collect compliance data. Results suggest observed vessels in the single-pinger-missing violation group were not responsive to the threat of consequence closures, while the multiple-pingers-missing group were. This reveals the importance of fisher input in constructing models. The model did not find sector membership to be significant. We suspect there may be an influence that varies across sectors. Vessels with lower inconsistent observer coverage were more likely to be non-complaint, suggesting compliance overall may be increased through “nudging,” a behavioral economics concept, via increased observer coverage. Increased observer coverage may be more cost-effective than increased enforcement. It is important to understand that regulatory change can introduce multiple incentives and disincentives influencing behavioral responses, as implemented in the 2010 Northeast U.S. groundfish gillnet fleet.

2010 年，如果不提高声威慑装置的遵守率，美国东北部的沉刺网船队将面临无限期关闭捕鱼的威胁。同时，针对底层鱼实施了一个多“部门”的渔获份额计划，这是该船队的一个重要目标。这项研究考察了关闭的威胁、向部门的过渡，或两者兼有，是否影响了 2010 年之后增加的遵守率。我们在焦点小组 [9] 中了解到，一些渔民出于安全原因放弃了一个 pinger。开发了一个使用威慑（发现不合规的感知可能性）、经济和规范（社会、文化、合法性）因素的多项 logit 模型来理解三种响应：完全合规、不合规（多个 pingers 丢失）、和不符合假定与安全有关（单个 pinger 丢失）。海上观察员收集合规数据。结果表明，在单个 pinger 缺失违规组中观察到的血管对后果关闭的威胁没有反应，而多个 pinger 缺失组则是。这揭示了渔民投入在构建模型中的重要性。该模型没有发现部门成员资格很重要。我们怀疑可能存在因行业而异的影响。观察员覆盖率不一致的船只更有可能不投诉，这表明通过增加观察员覆盖率，可以通过“轻推”这一行为经济学概念来提高整体合规性。增加观察员覆盖面可能比增加执法更具成本效益。