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CEO mobility and corporate policy risk
Journal of Corporate Finance ( IF 7.2 ) Pub Date : 2021-07-08 , DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2021.102037
Gönül Çolak 1 , Timo Korkeamäki 2
Affiliation  

Career concerns can limit a manager's willingness to take risks, which can lead to excessive policy conservatism. An increase in a CEO's ability and willingness to change jobs (CEO mobility) can diversify her human capital and reduce her conservatism. We derive several CEO mobility measures and relate them to a policy riskiness index that captures the overall risk embedded in a firm's corporate policies. We find a strong positive relation between CEO mobility and the riskiness of corporate policies. We also link external regulatory shocks that constrain labor mobility to significant drops in corporate risk-taking.



中文翻译:

CEO 流动性和公司政策风险

职业问题会限制管理者承担风险的意愿,从而导致过度的政策保守主义。CEO 换工作的能力和意愿的提高(CEO 流动性)可以使她的人力资本多样化并减少她的保守主义。我们推导出了几个 CEO 流动性指标,并将它们与一个政策风险指数相关联,该指数反映了公司政策中嵌入的整体风险。我们发现 CEO 流动性与公司政策风险之间存在很强的正相关关系。我们还将限制劳动力流动的外部监管冲击与企业风险承担的显着下降联系起来。

更新日期:2021-07-21
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