Purpose

This study aims to examine the effect of private (PRST) and public (PUST) sector-led financial sector transparencies on bank interest margins (BIM) termed as social cost of financial intermediation in different institutional quality setups.

Design/methodology/approach

This study uses a two-step dynamic generalized method of moments panel data and bootstrapped quantile models with 91 economies between 2004 and 2016. Data is sourced from World Development Indicator and Global Development Finance databases.

Findings

The results show that under strong and weak political and financial regulatory institutional setups, the reducing effect of PRST on BIM are observed and reported while the full sample reports no significant nexus between PRST and PUST on BIM. Furthermore, under political institutional quality sample, economies with strong corruption control and regulatory quality are able to reinforce the dampening effect of PRST on BIM while under the same political institutional quality sample, economies with weak rule of law are able to heighten the reducing effect of PRST on BIM. Moreover, under financial regulator institutional quality sample, economies with strong overall weighted and unweighted, chief executive officer and policy dependent central banks are able to intensify the diminishing effect of PRST on BIM while under the same financial regulator institutional quality sample, economies with weak limits on lending are able to amplify the reducing effect of PRST on BIM. However, PUST is reported to propel lower levels BIM in the bootstrap models, especially in strong institutional economies.

Practical implications

These findings imply that policymakers may rely on PRST to reduce BIM, especially under financial regulatory institutional quality. Additionally, economies must be careful on their reliance on PRST because the effectiveness of PRST to tame high BIM is dependent on the strength of political and financial regulatory institutions.

Originality/value

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study presents first time international evidence on the effect of private and public sector-led financial transparency on BIM in strong and weak political and financial regulatory institution economies.

中文翻译：

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金融部门透明度和银行利差：政治和金融监管机构的质量重要吗？

目的

本研究旨在检验私人 (PRST) 和公共 (PUST) 部门主导的金融部门透明度对银行利差 (BIM) 的影响，该利率被称为不同机构质量设置中金融中介的社会成本。

设计/方法/方法

本研究在 2004 年至 2016 年期间对 91 个经济体使用矩量面板数据和自举分位数模型的两步动态广义方法。数据来自世界发展指标和全球发展金融数据库。

发现

结果表明，在强弱的政治和金融监管制度设置下，PRST对BIM的降低作用得到观察和报告，而完整样本报告PRST和PUST对BIM的影响不显着。此外，在政治制度质量样本下，腐败控制和监管质量强的经济体能够增强PRST对BIM的抑制作用，而在相同的政治制度质量样本下，法治弱的经济体能够增强对BIM的抑制作用。 BIM 上的 PRST。此外，在金融监管机构质量样本下，整体加权和未加权的经济体，首席执行官和依赖政策的中央银行能够加强 PRST 对 BIM 的递减效应，而在相同的金融监管机构质量样本下，贷款限制较弱的经济体能够放大 PRST 对 BIM 的递减效应。然而，据报道，PUST 在引导模型中推动了较低水平的 BIM，尤其是在强大的制度经济体中。

实际影响

这些发现意味着政策制定者可能会依赖 PRST 来降低 BIM，尤其是在金融监管机构质量的情况下。此外，经济体在依赖 PRST 时必须谨慎，因为 PRST 驯服高 BIM 的有效性取决于政治和金融监管机构的实力。

原创性/价值

据作者所知，这项研究首次提供了关于私营和公共部门主导的财务透明度对 BIM 的影响的国际证据，在强弱的政治和金融监管机构经济体中。