A single-product retailer faces bargain hunting consumers whose willingness to pay incorporates sensations of gain and loss driven by differences between the observed price and prices they rationally expect in the spirit of Koszegi and Rabin (2006). We examine the Bayesian Nash equilibrium (non-commitment) pricing solution in which (i) the retailer maximizes profit given consumers' beliefs and (ii) consumers' beliefs are consistent with the retailer's choice. We show two novel results: First, a pure-strategy, uniform-price, equilibrium does not exist when consumers are bargain hunters who value gains more than losses. Second, in this case there exists a mixed strategy equilibrium and all mixed strategy equilibria involve the same retailer profit. The equilibrium retailer profit is (weakly) lower than in the absence of reference effects.

单一产品零售商面临着讨价还价的消费者，他们的支付意愿包含由观察到的价格与他们本着 Koszegi 和 Rabin（2006 年）的精神理性预期的价格之间的差异所驱动的得失感。我们研究了贝叶斯纳什均衡（非承诺）定价解决方案，其中 (i) 零售商在给定消费者信念的情况下最大化利润，以及 (ii) 消费者的信念与零售商的选择一致。我们展示了两个新颖的结果：首先，当消费者是看重收益多于损失的逢低买入者时，不存在纯策略、统一价格的均衡。其次，在这种情况下，存在混合策略均衡，所有混合策略均衡都涉及相同的零售商利润。均衡零售商利润（弱）低于没有参考效应的情况。