In order to promote green technology investment and emission reduction, the government usually provides subsidies to enterprises under the cap-and-trade (C&T) mechanism. Two types of subsidy policies are widely used: one is based on fixed green technology investment cost (FC subsidy) and the other is based on the amount of emission reduction (ER subsidy). This paper investigates the effects of these two government subsidies on the green decisions of a two-echelon supply chain under C&T scheme. Three Stackelberg game models are formulated and analyzed. The analytical results indicate that both manufacturer and retailer tend to collaborate on green marketing when green technology is invested and subsidized. However, the government's subsidy policy cannot guarantee green technology investment and total carbon emission reduction which also depend on the range of green investment cost, emission reduction rate of green technology and the carbon emission intensity of manufacturers. Indeed, higher subsidy will result in the implementation of more expensive but cleaner green technology. With the same subsidy budget, the manufacturer can earn more and emit less under FC subsidy, but ER subsidy can bring more profit to retailer and induce more green production and greater green marketing efforts. Therefore, the government can use FC subsidy on developed and high emission industries to control total emission and adopt ER subsidy on emerging or developing industries to promote their development.

为促进绿色技术投资和减排，政府通常在限额与交易（C&T）机制下向企业提供补贴。两种补贴政策被广泛采用：一种是基于固定的绿色技术投资成本（FC 补贴），另一种是基于减排量（ER 补贴）。本文研究了这两项政府补贴对科联计划下两梯队供应链绿色决策的影响。制定并分析了三个 Stackelberg 博弈模型。分析结果表明，当绿色技术得到投资和补贴时，制造商和零售商都倾向于在绿色营销上进行合作。然而，政府' 补贴政策不能保证绿色技术投资和碳减排总量，这还取决于绿色投资成本的范围、绿色技术的减排率和制造商的碳排放强度。事实上，更高的补贴将导致实施更昂贵但更清洁的绿色技术。在相同的补贴预算下，制造商在FC补贴下可以赚得更多，排放更少，而ER补贴可以为零售商带来更多的利润，并引发更多的绿色生产和更大的绿色营销力度。因此，政府可以通过对发达和高排放行业的FC补贴来控制排放总量，对新兴或发展中行业采取ER补贴来促进其发展。绿色技术的减排率和制造商的碳排放强度。事实上，更高的补贴将导致实施更昂贵但更清洁的绿色技术。在相同的补贴预算下，制造商在FC补贴下可以赚得更多，排放更少，而ER补贴可以为零售商带来更多的利润，并引发更多的绿色生产和更大的绿色营销力度。因此，政府可以通过对发达和高排放行业的FC补贴来控制排放总量，对新兴或发展中行业采取ER补贴来促进其发展。绿色技术的减排率和制造商的碳排放强度。事实上，更高的补贴将导致实施更昂贵但更清洁的绿色技术。在相同的补贴预算下，制造商在FC补贴下可以赚得更多，排放更少，而ER补贴可以为零售商带来更多的利润，并引发更多的绿色生产和更大的绿色营销力度。因此，政府可以通过对发达和高排放行业的FC补贴来控制排放总量，对新兴或发展中行业采取ER补贴来促进其发展。在FC补贴下，制造商可以赚得更多，排放更少，而ER补贴可以为零售商带来更多的利润，并引发更多的绿色生产和更大的绿色营销力度。因此，政府可以通过对发达和高排放行业的FC补贴来控制排放总量，对新兴或发展中行业采取ER补贴来促进其发展。在FC补贴下，制造商可以赚得更多，排放更少，而ER补贴可以为零售商带来更多的利润，并引发更多的绿色生产和更大的绿色营销力度。因此，政府可以通过对发达和高排放行业的FC补贴来控制排放总量，对新兴或发展中行业采取ER补贴来促进其发展。