Past research indicates that increasing the economic consequences of evaluations should theoretically discourage discrimination by making it more costly. I theorize that such consequences may also encourage discrimination in settings in which evaluators may be motivated by performance expectations, e.g., stereotypes. I explore this theory using data from an online lending platform whose loan guarantee policy reduced the potential economic consequences of using borrowers’ demographics during lending decisions. I find evidence that with the policy in place, lenders evaluated female borrowers less favorably than male borrowers. This finding is consistent with the theory that the policy discouraged performance-motivated discrimination (that driven by beliefs about performance abilities) and simultaneously encouraged consumption-motivated discrimination (that driven by a like or dislike of others because of their demographic traits). Because I theorize about underlying motives for discrimination, the insights developed here should apply to a wide range of types of discrimination that vary according to these motives, including classic taste-based discrimination, homophily-driven discrimination, statistical discrimination, and status-based discrimination. Economic consequences may therefore represent an important dynamic link between different types of discrimination.

过去的研究表明，增加评估的经济后果理论上应该通过提高成本来阻止歧视。我的理论是，在评估者可能受绩效期望（例如刻板印象）激励的环境中，这种后果也可能会鼓励歧视。我使用来自在线借贷平台的数据探索这一理论，该平台的贷款担保政策减少了在贷款决策中使用借款人人口统计数据的潜在经济后果。我发现证据表明，随着政策的实施，贷方对女性借款人的评价不如男性借款人。这一发现与以下理论一致，即该政策不鼓励绩效驱动的歧视（由对绩效能力的信念驱动），同时鼓励消费驱动的歧视（由于其他人的人口特征而喜欢或不喜欢他们）。因为我对歧视的潜在动机进行了理论分析，所以这里得出的见解应该适用于根据这些动机而异的各种类型的歧视，包括经典的基于品味的歧视、同质性驱动的歧视、统计歧视和基于地位的歧视. 因此，经济后果可能代表不同类型歧视之间的重要动态联系。因为我对歧视的潜在动机进行了理论分析，所以这里得出的见解应该适用于根据这些动机而异的各种类型的歧视，包括经典的基于品味的歧视、同质性驱动的歧视、统计歧视和基于地位的歧视. 因此，经济后果可能代表不同类型歧视之间的重要动态联系。因为我对歧视的潜在动机进行了理论分析，所以这里得出的见解应该适用于根据这些动机而异的各种类型的歧视，包括经典的基于品味的歧视、同质性驱动的歧视、统计歧视和基于地位的歧视. 因此，经济后果可能代表不同类型歧视之间的重要动态联系。