Epistemic rationality seems to permit a more steadfast response to disagreements over our fundamental convictions than it does for our ordinary beliefs. Why is this? This essay explores three answers to this question: web-of-belief conservatism, moral encroachment, and hinge theories, and argues that hinge theories do a better job than the alternatives at vindicating the intuition that there is a rationally permissible asymmetry in our responses to disagreements over ordinary beliefs and fundamental convictions. The essay also shows how hinge theorists can explain the existence of moral hinge propositions, which enables them to account for the rational permissibility of being steadfast in response to disagreements over fundamental moral convictions.

中文翻译：

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道德铰链和坚定不移

与我们的普通信念相比，认知理性似乎允许对我们基本信念的分歧做出更坚定的回应。为什么是这样？这篇文章探讨了这个问题的三个答案：信仰网络保守主义、道德侵蚀和铰链理论，并认为铰链理论在证明直觉上比其他选择做得更好对普通信仰和基本信念的分歧。这篇文章还展示了铰链理论家如何解释道德铰链命题的存在，这使他们能够解释对基本道德信念的分歧做出坚定回应的合理允许性。