Luck skepticism is the view that no one is ever morally responsible for anything because of the nature and ubiquity of luck. One acclaimed argument in favor of this view is Neil Levy's luck pincer. The luck pincer holds that all morally significant acts or events involve either present luck, constitutive luck, or both and that present and constitutive luck each negate moral responsibility. Therefore, no one is ever morally responsible for any action or event. I argue that this argument is unsound as both of its premises are false. First, not all morally significant events involve present or constitutive luck. Some morally significant events are non-lucky. Second, present and constitutive luck do not always negate moral responsibility. Luck – independent of ontological concerns – is not as threatening to free will as is often thought.

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幸运钳与幸运有什么关系？

运气怀疑论者认为，由于运气的本质和无处不在，没有人对任何事情负有道德责任。支持这一观点的一个广受赞誉的论据是尼尔利维的运气钳。运气钳认为，所有具有道德意义的行为或事件都涉及现在的运气、构成的运气或两者兼而有之，而现在的运气和构成的运气都否定了道德责任。因此，没有人对任何行为或事件负有道德责任。我认为这个论点是不可靠的，因为它的两个前提都是错误的。首先，并非所有具有道德意义的事件都涉及当前或构成性的运气。一些具有道德意义的事件是非幸运的。其次，目前的和构成性的运气并不总是否定道德责任。运气——独立于本体论的考虑——并不像人们通常认为的那样对自由意志构成威胁。