The article analyses the meaning of the nondiscriminatory principle in disputes concerning Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) under EU competition and contract law (that is, ND prong). The article reviews the economics literature, looking at the welfare effect of price discrimination and the interpretation of the ND prong provided by a number of economists. Secondly, the article analyses the case law of the EU Court of Justice on Art. 102(c) TFEU and recent rulings by the German and British courts concerning the scope of the application of the ND prong. A strategy of discrimination in regard to royalty rates may be sanctioned, both under competition and contract law. However, Art. 102(c) requires a higher burden of proof than contract law. As a consequence, it is unsurprising that no case of royalty rate discrimination has ever been sanctioned in Europe as an abuse of dominance. While courts and economists generally agree that the ND prong is applicable only when licensees are “similarly situated,” to date, there is no common understanding of the meaning of this expression. In particular, it is unclear whether, and to what extent, licensees are “similarly situated” if they are not competitors in the downstream market.

中文翻译：

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标准必要专利中的非歧视性；ND 叉诉艺术。102(C) TFEU

文章分析了欧盟竞争法和合同法（即ND prong）下标准必要专利（SEPs）纠纷中非歧视性原则的含义。本文回顾了经济学文献，着眼于价格歧视的福利效应以及一些经济学家提供的对 ND 叉的解释。其次，文章分析了欧盟法院关于艺术的判例法。102(c) TFEU 以及德国和英国法院最近关于 ND 叉的适用范围的裁决。根据竞争法和合同法，在特许权使用费方面的歧视策略可能会受到制裁。然而，艺术。102(c) 要求比合同法更高的举证责任。作为结果，不足为奇的是，在欧洲，没有任何特许权使用费歧视案件被认定为滥用支配地位。虽然法院和经济学家普遍认为 ND 插脚仅适用于被许可人“处于类似情况”的情况，但迄今为止，对该表达的含义尚无共识。特别是，如果被许可人不是下游市场的竞争者，他们是否以及在何种程度上处于“相似地位”尚不清楚。