The antitrust enforcement Agencies’ 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines (VMGs) introduce a nontechnical application of bargaining theory into the competitive assessment of vertical acquisitions. This bargaining theory has much in common with the theory of unilateral effects that is applied to horizontal mergers. The VMGs focus on post-merger price increases requires consideration of a vertical merger’s role in eliminating double marginalization (EDM). The problem occurs when two bargaining firms both have market power but are unable to coordinate their output. Assessing EDM bundles two themes that Ronald Coase developed in his two most well-known articles: “The Nature of the Firm” and “The Problem of Social Cost”. The first argued that the boundaries of a firm are determined by the firm’s continuous search to minimize costs. The second argued that two traders in a well-functioning market will achieve the joint-maximizing solution. Anti-interventionists rely heavily on Coasean arguments that unless high transaction costs get in the way firms will bargain to joint maximizing results. If that is true, then double marginalization will rarely provide a defense to a vertical merger. The law of vertical mergers deals largely with firms that transact with one another routinely, in legally enforceable buy-sell relationships. In a well-functioning vertical market durable double marginalization should be rare.

反垄断执法机构的 2020 年纵向并购指南 (VMG) 将讨价还价理论的非技术应用引入纵向收购的竞争评估中。这种讨价还价理论与适用于横向合并的单边效应理论有很多共同之处。VMG 关注合并后的价格上涨需要考虑垂直合并在消除双重边缘化 (EDM) 中的作用。当两个谈判公司都拥有市场力量但无法协调他们的产出时，就会出现问题。评估 EDM 捆绑了 Ronald Coase 在其两篇最著名的文章中提出的两个主题：“公司的本质”和“社会成本问题”。第一种观点认为，公司的边界是由公司不断寻求使成本最小化而确定的。第二种观点认为，运行良好的市场中的两个交易者将实现联合最大化解决方案。反干预主义者严重依赖科斯的论点，即除非高交易成本妨碍公司谈判以实现联合最大化结果。如果这是真的，那么双重边缘化将很少为纵向合并提供防御。纵向合并法主要涉及在具有法律强制执行力的买卖关系中相互进行常规交易的公司。在运作良好的垂直市场中，持久的双重边缘化应该很少见。那么双重边缘化很少会为纵向合并提供防御。纵向合并法主要涉及那些在法律上具有强制执行力的买卖关系中相互进行常规交易的公司。在运作良好的垂直市场中，持久的双重边缘化应该很少见。那么双重边缘化很少会为纵向合并提供防御。纵向合并法主要涉及那些在法律上具有强制执行力的买卖关系中相互进行常规交易的公司。在运作良好的垂直市场中，持久的双重边缘化应该很少见。