One of the fundamental questions in post-Fregean philosophy is how to account for the normativity involved in assertoric claims once the traditional subject-object view of thinking is rejected. One of the more productive lines of inquiry in the contemporary literature attributes normativity to second nature, which is presented as a sui generis space of reason giving and receiving distinct from the space of nature studied by the natural sciences. In this paper I suggest an alternative account by drawing from Castoriadis’s philosophical interpretation of autopoiesis. For Castoriadis, the idea of second nature protects the modern conception of nature from undergoing the radical critique it requires, for it restricts normativity to the anthropic sphere. In contrast, he proposes an autopoietic account of the subject that grounds the capacity to know that one knows in the activity of the living being. Castoriadis demonstrates that the normativity of assertoric claims is not a vertical break from nature but rather a horizontal transformation of the biological capacity for self-referentiality.

中文翻译：

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判断、规范性和主体

后弗雷格哲学的基本问题之一是，一旦传统的主客体思维观点被拒绝，如何解释断言主张中涉及的规范性。当代文学中更有成效的探究路线之一将规范性归于第二自然，第二自然被呈现为与自然科学研究的自然空间不同的独特的理性给予和接受空间。在这篇论文中，我从卡斯托里亚迪斯对自创生的哲学解释中提出了另一种解释。对于卡斯托里亚迪斯来说，第二自然的观念保护现代自然概念免于经受它所需要的激进批判，因为它将规范性限制在人为领域。相比之下，他提出了对主体的自创生描述，该描述奠定了人们在生物活动中知道的能力的基础。Castoriadis 证明，断言主张的规范性不是与自然的垂直断裂，而是自我指涉的生物学能力的横向转变。