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Redefining Illusion and Hallucination in Light of New Cases
Philosophical Issues ( IF 0.6 ) Pub Date : 2016-10-01 , DOI: 10.1111/phis.12086
Fiona Macpherson 1 , Clare Batty 2
Affiliation  

In this paper, we present new cases of illusion and hallucination that have not heretofore been identified. We argue that such cases show that the traditional accounts of illusion and hallucination are incorrect because they do not identify all of the cases of non-veridical experience that they need to and they elide important differences between cases. In light of this, we present new and exhaustive definitions of illusion and hallucination. First, we explicate the traditional accounts of illusion and hallucination. We then proceed to outline cases of pure property experience—that is, experience as of properties, but not as of objects. We suggest that some might find it to be plausible that olfactory experience is of this kind. We argue that, within instances of such pure property experience, one can identify cases of veridical property perception, illusory property perception and hallucinatory property experience. With these distinctions in hand, we re-examine ordinary cases of experiences as of objects having properties. Drawing on the ideas uncovered by considering pure property experience, we bring to light many new cases of illusion and hallucination within ordinary experience as of objects having properties. These consist in different combinations of veridical perception, illusory perception and hallucination of both objects and properties. In order to accept that these new cases of illusion and hallucination exist in ordinary experience as of objects having properties, nothing turns on accepting the idea that there is pure property experience, or that olfactory

中文翻译:

根据新病例重新定义幻觉和幻觉

在本文中,我们介绍了迄今为止尚未发现的幻觉和幻觉的新案例。我们认为,这些案例表明,对幻觉和幻觉的传统描述是不正确的,因为它们没有识别出他们需要的所有非真实经验案例,并且它们忽略了案例之间的重要差异。有鉴于此,我们提出了幻觉和幻觉的全新且详尽的定义。首先,我们解释幻觉和幻觉的传统解释。然后我们继续概述纯属性经验的案例——即作为属性的经验,而不是作为对象的经验。我们建议有些人可能会认为这种嗅觉体验是合理的。我们认为,在这种纯粹的财产经验的情况下,可以识别真实的财产感知、虚幻的财产感知和幻觉的财产体验。有了这些区别,我们重新审视了经验的普通案例,作为具有属性的对象。借鉴通过考虑纯属性体验而发现的想法,我们揭示了普通经验中的许多新的幻觉和幻觉案例,例如具有属性的对象。这些包括真实知觉、虚幻知觉和对象和属性的幻觉的不同组合。为了接受这些新的幻觉和幻觉案例存在于作为具有属性的物体的日常经验中,没有任何东西开始接受存在纯粹的属性体验或嗅觉的想法 有了这些区别,我们重新审视了经验的普通案例,作为具有属性的对象。借鉴通过考虑纯属性体验而发现的想法,我们揭示了普通经验中的许多新的幻觉和幻觉案例,例如具有属性的对象。这些包括真实知觉、虚幻知觉和对象和属性的幻觉的不同组合。为了接受这些新的幻觉和幻觉案例存在于作为具有属性的物体的日常经验中,没有任何东西开始接受存在纯粹的属性体验或嗅觉的想法 有了这些区别,我们重新审视了经验的普通案例,作为具有属性的对象。借鉴通过考虑纯属性体验而发现的想法,我们揭示了普通经验中的许多新的幻觉和幻觉案例,例如具有属性的对象。这些包括真实知觉、虚幻知觉和对象和属性的幻觉的不同组合。为了接受这些新的幻觉和幻觉案例存在于作为具有属性的物体的日常经验中,没有任何东西开始接受存在纯粹的属性体验或嗅觉的想法 我们在普通经验中揭示了许多新的幻觉和幻觉案例,例如具有属性的物体。这些包括真实知觉、虚幻知觉和对象和属性的幻觉的不同组合。为了接受这些新的幻觉和幻觉案例存在于作为具有属性的物体的日常经验中,没有任何东西开始接受存在纯粹的属性体验或嗅觉的想法 我们在普通经验中揭示了许多新的幻觉和幻觉案例,例如具有属性的物体。这些包括真实知觉、虚幻知觉和对象和属性的幻觉的不同组合。为了接受这些新的幻觉和幻觉案例存在于作为具有属性的物体的日常经验中,没有任何东西开始接受存在纯粹的属性体验或嗅觉的想法
更新日期:2016-10-01
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