Humeans identify the laws of nature with universal generalizations that systematize rather than govern the particular matters of fact. Humeanism is frequently accused of circularity: laws explain their instances, but Humean laws are, in turn, grounded by those instances. Unfortunately, this argument trades on controversial assumptions about grounding and explanation that Humeans routinely reject. However, recently an ostensibly semantic circularity objection has been offered, which seeks to avoid reading such assumptions into the Humean view. This paper argues that the new semantic version tacitly relies on the familiar metaphysical one and, therefore, it ultimately brings nothing new to the table.

中文翻译：

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对休谟定律没有明显的语义循环性异议

休谟斯用普遍的概括来识别自然法则，这些概括系统化而不是支配特定的事实问题。休谟主义经常被指责循环性：法律解释了它们的实例，但休谟法反过来又以这些实例为基础。不幸的是，这个论点以休谟斯经常拒绝的关于基础和解释的有争议的假设进行交易。然而，最近提出了一个表面上语义循环的反对意见，旨在避免将这些假设读入休谟观点。本文认为，新的语义版本默认依赖于熟悉的形而上学版本，因此，它最终没有带来任何新的东西。