We study the effects of granting an exit option allowing the private party to terminate a Public–Private Partnerships contract early if it turns out to be loss-making. In a continuous-time setting with hidden information about the private returns on investment, we show that an exit option, acting as a risk-sharing device, can soften agency problems and, in so doing, spur investment and increase the government's expected payoff, even while taking into account the costs that the public sector will have to meet in the future to resume the project.

中文翻译：

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退出选项是否会增加公私伙伴关系的资金价值？

我们研究了授予退出选择权的影响，允许社会资本在公私合营合同被证明是亏损的情况下提前终止该合同。在隐含私人投资回报信息的连续时间环境中，我们表明作为风险分担工具的退出选项可以缓解代理问题，从而刺激投资并增加政府的预期收益，即使考虑到公共部门在未来恢复项目所需的成本。