The host government (HG) of resource-rich countries (RRC) dealing with multiple International Oil Companies (IOCs) faces a choice between making a simultaneous multilateral offer and a sequential bilateral offer on equity shares from resource value. Provided that the HG treats all its foreign partners in a simultaneous negotiation as a single entity, it is argued that the HG is predicted to gain a higher equity share from a simultaneous multilateral bargaining deal than from a sequential bilateral one with each player. Furthermore, we argue that in case of positive weak externality from a sequential bilateral game, HG would still prefer a simultaneous multilateral game due to superadditivity and efficiency properties of grand coalition.

中文翻译：

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自然资源谈判

与多家国际石油公司 (IOC) 打交道的资源丰富国家 (RRC) 的东道国政府 (HG) 面临着一个选择：同时多边报价和顺序双边从资源价值中发行股票。如果 HG 将同时谈判中的所有外国合作伙伴视为一个实体，则有人认为，预计 HG 从同时进行的多边谈判交易中获得的股权份额将高于与每个参与者的连续双边谈判交易。此外，我们认为，在顺序双边博弈的正弱外部性的情况下，由于大联盟的超可加性和效率特性，HG 仍然更喜欢同时的多边博弈。