Legal designers use different mechanisms to entrench constitutions. This article studies one mechanism that has received little attention: constitutional “locks,” or forced waiting periods for amendments. We begin by presenting a global survey, which reveals that locks appear in sixty-seven national constitutions. They vary in length from nine days to six years, and they vary in reach, with some countries “locking” their entire constitution and others locking only select parts. After presenting the survey, we consider rationales for locks. Scholars tend to lump locks with other tools of entrenchment, such as bicameralism and supermajority rule, but we argue that locks have distinct and interesting features. Specifically, we theorize that locks can cool passions better than other entrenchment mechanisms, promote principled deliberation by placing lawmakers behind a veil of ignorance, and protect minority groups by creating space for political bargaining. Legislators cannot work around locks, and because locks are simple and transparent, lawmakers cannot “break” them without drawing attention. For these reasons, we theorize that locks facilitate constitutional credibility and self-enforcement, perhaps better than other entrenchment mechanisms.

中文翻译：

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宪法锁

法律设计者使用不同的机制来巩固宪法。本文研究了一种很少受到关注的机制：宪法“锁定”，或强制等待修正期。我们首先介绍一项全球调查，该调查显示锁定出现在 67 个国家宪法中。它们的长度从 9 天到 6 年不等，覆盖范围也各不相同，一些国家“锁定”了整个宪法，而另一些国家只锁定了部分宪法。在介绍了调查之后，我们考虑了锁定的基本原理。学者们倾向于将锁与其他防御工具混为一谈，例如两院制和绝对多数规则，但我们认为锁具有独特而有趣的特征。具体来说，我们认为锁比其他防御机制更能冷却激情，通过将立法者置于无知的面纱之下来促进有原则的审议，并通过为政治讨价还价创造空间来保护少数群体。立法者不能绕过锁，因为锁简单而透明，立法者不能在不引起注意的情况下“破坏”它们。由于这些原因，我们推测锁有助于宪法的可信度和自我执行，可能比其他防御机制更好。