ABSTRACT

This paper explores the nature and value of melancholy and the rationality of being in such a state. I defend a view of melancholy as a highly complex mood-like state. This complexity shows itself in the nature of the state itself (being at once affective, cognitive, and perceptual), its valence (involving a mix of pleasure and pain and positive and negative emotions), and its typical objects (positive and negative qualities, thematically related by their existential significance). With respect to the value and rationality of melancholy, I argue that human existence is such as to give us standing pro tanto reasons for melancholy by being an appropriate response to reality and value. However, the same reasons that count in favour of melancholy may also count against a melancholic state, once we take into account the way in which we are not only passive responders, but also agents that can respond to value through actions. I conclude that melancholy is not always a rational state, but that a full and good life must make room for melancholy.

摘要

本文探讨了忧郁的本质和价值，以及处于这种状态的合理性。我捍卫将忧郁视为一种高度复杂的情绪状态的观点。这种复杂性表现在状态本身的性质（同时具有情感、认知和知觉）、它的效价（包括愉悦和痛苦以及积极和消极情绪的混合）以及它的典型对象（积极和消极品质，通过它们的存在意义在主题上相关）。关于忧郁的价值和合理性，我认为人类的存在是对现实和价值的适当回应，从而为我们提供了忧郁的立论理由。然而，有利于忧郁的相同原因也可能不利于忧郁状态，一旦我们考虑到我们不仅是被动响应者的方式，也是可以通过行动响应价值的代理。我的结论是，忧郁并不总是一种理性状态，而是充实而美好的生活必须为忧郁留出空间。