In this paper I will evaluate whether some knowledge states that are interpretatively derived from statistical mechanical probabilities could be somehow relevant in actual practices, as famously rejected by Albert (Time and chance, Harvard University Press, 2000). On one side, I follow Frigg (in: Ernst & Hüttermann (eds) Probability in Boltzmannian statistical mechanics, 2010) in rejecting the causal relevance of knowledge states as a mere byproduct of misinterpreting this theoretical field. On the other side, I will argue against Uffink (in: Beisbart & Hartmann (eds) Probabilities in physics, Oxford University Press, 2011) that probability-represented epistemic states cannot be explanatorily relevant, because (i) probabilities cannot faithfully represent significant epistemic states, and (ii) those states cannot satisfactorily account for why an agent should theoretically believe or expect something.

在这篇论文中，我将评估一些从统计力学概率解释性推导出来的知识状态是否在实际实践中可能有某种相关性，正如阿尔伯特所拒绝的那样（时间和机会，哈佛大学出版社，2000 年）。一方面，我遵循 Frigg（在：Ernst & Hüttermann (eds) Probability in Boltzmannian Statistics Mechanical, 2010）拒绝将知识状态的因果相关性视为误解这一理论领域的副产品。另一方面，我将反对 Uffink（在：Beisbart & Hartmann (eds) Probabilities in Physics, Oxford University Press, 2011），即概率表示的认知状态不能解释相关，因为（i）概率不能忠实地表示重要的认知状态状态，