Some Presentists—according to whom everything is present—identify instants of time with propositions of a certain kind. However, the view that times are propositions seems to be at odds with Presentism: if there are times then there are past times, and therefore things that are past; but how could there be things that are past if everything is present? In this paper, we describe the Presentist view that times are propositions (Sect. 2); we set out the argument that Presentism is incompatible with the view that times are propositions (Sect. 3); and then we describe three possible responses to that argument on behalf of Presentists who identify times with propositions (Sect. 4). We argue that each of these responses comes with significant costs. Finally, we describe a fourth possible response—according to which times are irreducibly higher-order entities—which appears to avoid the costs of the other three (Sect. 5). We also describe and respond to two objections to the higher-order strategy (Sect. 6).

一些呈现论者——根据他们的观点，一切都在场——用某种命题来识别时间的瞬间。然而，时间是命题的观点似乎与现在主义不一致：如果有时间那么就有过去时代，因此过去的事情；但如果一切都存在，怎么会有过去的事情呢？在本文中，我们描述了当下主义的观点，即时间是命题（第 2 节）；我们提出了现在主义与时间是命题的观点不相容的论点（第 3 节）；然后我们代表用命题识别时间的呈现者描述了对该论证的三种可能的回应（第 4 节）。我们认为，这些回应中的每一个都伴随着巨大的成本。最后，我们描述了第四种可能的响应——根据哪些时间是不可约的高阶实体——它似乎避免了其他三个的成本（第 5 节）。我们还描述并回应了对高阶策略的两个反对意见（第 6 节）。