It is widely accepted that classical logic is trivialized in the presence of a transparent truth-predicate. In this paper, we will explain why this point of view must be given up. The hierarchy of metainferential logics defined in Barrio et al. (Journal of Philosophical Logic, 1–28, 2019) and Pailos (The Review of Symbolic Logic, Forthcoming) recovers classical logic, either in the sense that every classical (meta)inferential validity is valid at some point in the hierarchy (as is stressed in Barrio et al. (Journal of Philosophical Logic, 1–28, 2019)), or because a logic of a transfinite level defined in terms of the hierarchy shares its validities with classical logic. Each of these logics is consistent with transparent truth—as is shown in Pailos (The Review of Symbolic Logic, Forthcoming)—, and this suggests that, contrary to standard opinions, transparent truth is after all consistent with classical logic. However, Scambler (Journal of Philosophical Logic, 49, 351–370, 2020) presents a major challenge to this approach. He argues that this hierarchy cannot be identified with classical logic in any way, because it recovers no classical antivalidities. We embrace Scambler’s challenge and develop a new logic based on these hierarchies. This logic recovers both every classical validity and every classical antivalidity. Moreover, we will follow the same strategy and show that contingencies need also be taken into account, and that none of the logics so far presented is enough to capture classical contingencies. Then, we will develop a multi-standard approach to elaborate a new logic that captures not only every classical validity, but also every classical antivalidity and contingency. As a€truth-predicate can be added to this logic, this result can be interpreted as showing that, despite the claims that are extremely widely accepted, classical logic does not trivialize in the context of transparent truth.

人们普遍认为，在存在透明的真值谓词的情况下，经典逻辑是微不足道的。在本文中，我们将解释为什么必须放弃这种观点。Barrio 等人定义的元推断逻辑的层次结构。( Journal of Philosophical Logic , 1–28, 2019) 和 Pailos ( The Review of Symbolic Logic , Forthcoming ) 恢复了经典逻辑，无论是在每个经典（元）推理有效性在层次结构中的某个点（原样） Barrio et al. ( Journal of Philosophical Logic , 1–28, 2019) 中强调，或者因为根据层次结构定义的超限级别的逻辑与经典逻辑共享其有效性。这些逻辑中的每一个都与透明的真理一致——如 Pailos (The Review of Symbolic Logic , Forthcoming)—，这表明，与标准观点相反，透明的真理毕竟与经典逻辑一致。然而，Scambler（哲学逻辑杂志，49, 351–370, 2020) 对这种方法提出了重大挑战。他认为，这种层次结构不能以任何方式与经典逻辑相一致，因为它没有恢复经典的反有效性。我们接受了 Scambler 的挑战，并基于这些层次结构开发了一种新的逻辑。这个逻辑恢复了每一个经典有效性和每一个经典反有效性。此外，我们将遵循相同的策略，并表明也需要考虑偶然性，到目前为止所介绍的逻辑都不足以捕捉经典的偶然性。然后，我们将开发一种多标准的方法来阐述一种新的逻辑，该逻辑不仅可以捕获所有经典有效性，还可以捕获所有经典反有效性和偶然性。由于可以在此逻辑中添加真实谓词，因此可以将此结果解释为表明，