ABSTRACT

In many different ontological debates, anti-arbitrariness considerations push one towards two opposing extremes. For example, in debates about mereology, one may be pushed towards a maximal ontology (mereological universalism) or a minimal ontology (mereological nihilism), because any intermediate view seems objectionably arbitrary. However, it is usually thought that anti-arbitrariness considerations on their own cannot decide between these maximalist or minimalist views. I will argue that this is a mistake. Anti-arbitrariness arguments may be used to motivate a certain popular thesis in the philosophy of mathematics that rules out the maximalist view in many different ontological debates.

摘要

在许多不同的本体论辩论中，反任意性考虑将一个考虑推向两个相反的极端。例如，在关于分体论的辩论中，人们可能会被推向一种最大本体论（分体论普遍主义）或一种最小本体论（分体论虚无主义），因为任何中间观点似乎都是令人反感的武断。然而，人们通常认为，反任意性考虑本身无法在这些极端主义观点或极简主义观点之间做出决定。我会争辩说这是一个错误。反任意性论证可以用来激发数学哲学中某个流行的论点，该论点排除了许多不同本体论辩论中的极大主义观点。