We study coordination among competitors in the shadow of a market mechanism. Our main example is standard setting: either firms coordinate through a standard-setting organization (SSO), or a market solution—a standards war—emerges. A firms veto to participate in the SSO triggers a standards war. Participation constraints are demanding, and the optimal SSO can involve on-path vetoes. We show that vetoes are effectively deterred if firms can (partially) release their private information to the public. We discuss several business practices that can serve as a signaling device to provide that information and to effectively ensure coordination.

我们在市场机制的阴影下研究竞争者之间的协调。我们的主要例子是标准制定：要么公司通过标准制定组织 (SSO) 进行协调，要么出现市场解决方案——标准战争。公司否决参与 SSO 引发了一场标准战争。参与约束要求很高，并且最佳 SSO 可能涉及路径上的否决权。我们表明，如果公司可以（部分）向公众发布他们的私人信息，否决权就会被有效地阻止。我们讨论了几种商业实践，它们可以作为提供信息和有效确保协调的信号装置。