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An Incentive-Compatible Routing Protocol for Delay-Tolerant Networks Using Second-Price Sealed-Bid Auction Mechanism
Wireless Personal Communications ( IF 1.9 ) Pub Date : 2021-07-02 , DOI: 10.1007/s11277-021-08684-w
Amir Babazadeh Nanehkaran 1 , Mohammad Hossein Rezvani 2
Affiliation  

Delay Tolerant Networks are a type of challenging, uninterrupted network in which there is not an end-to-end path between the source and the destination. These networks play a key role in managing crises in natural disasters such as earthquakes, fires, floods, and more. Due to limited resources, nodes may be reluctant to cooperate in the message relaying and may behave selfishly. Eventually, this lack of cooperation can result in performance degradation. Game theory is one of the mathematical tools to motivate the intermediate nodes to forward messages. In this paper, we use the theory of auction between relay nodes to motivate them to collaborate in forwarding messages. Based on the second-price sealed-bid auction mechanism, the node that does not cooperate in forwarding messages fails to acquire utility. In this way, if the node itself intends to send a message to another node, it will not be able to do so due to a lack of budget. Thus, the selfish behavior of the node causes it to be harmed. Our simulations using the ONE simulator shows that the performance of the proposed method in moderate traffic is improved in terms of significant criteria such as delivery ratio, average buffer usage, hop count, overhead, and so on. The results also show that under intense traffic conditions, the performance of the proposed method is far better than that of moderate traffic.



中文翻译:

使用第二价格密封投标拍卖机制的延迟容忍网络的激励兼容路由协议

延迟容忍网络是一种具有挑战性的不间断网络,其中源和目标之间没有端到端路径。这些网络在管理地震、火灾、洪水等自然灾害中的危机方面发挥着关键作用。由于资源有限,节点可能不愿意在消息中继中合作并且可能表现得自私。最终,这种缺乏合作会导致性能下降。博弈论是激励中间节点转发消息的数学工具之一。在本文中,我们使用中继节点之间的拍卖理论来激励它们协作转发消息。基于二价密封拍卖机制,不配合转发消息的节点无法获得效用。这样,如果节点本身打算向另一个节点发送消息,由于预算不足,它将无法这样做。因此,节点的自私行为导致它受到伤害。我们使用 ONE 模拟器的模拟表明,所提出的方法在中等流量下的性能在诸如交付率、平均缓冲区使用率、跳数、开销等重要标准方面得到了提高。结果还表明,在交通繁忙的情况下,所提方法的性能远优于中等交通情况。我们使用 ONE 模拟器的模拟表明,所提出的方法在中等流量下的性能在诸如交付率、平均缓冲区使用率、跳数、开销等重要标准方面得到了提高。结果还表明,在交通繁忙的情况下,所提方法的性能远优于中等交通情况。我们使用 ONE 模拟器的模拟表明,所提出的方法在中等流量下的性能在诸如交付率、平均缓冲区使用率、跳数、开销等重要标准方面得到了提高。结果还表明,在交通繁忙的情况下,所提方法的性能远优于中等交通情况。

更新日期:2021-07-04
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