Acquirer advisors now often arrange syndicated loans financing merger and acquisition deals they advise on. This paper shows that such an advisor-lender dual role facilitates valuable big-ticket deals. There is a positive announcement effect for the acquirer which also shows no systematic post-deal underperformance—dispelling concerns about the advisor abetting managerial empire building. But advisor-led syndicated loans, despite being larger in size, have higher loan spreads than those led by non-advisors. Advisors apparently have an information advantage but rent extraction is unlikely. The higher charges are justifiable in view of the significantly lower post-deal creditworthiness of dual-role bidders. Advisor-lender's superior information about adverse changes in the credit risk is rationally priced into the dual-role interest rate premium.

收购方顾问现在经常安排银团贷款，为他们提供建议的并购交易融资。本文表明，这种顾问-贷方双重角色促进了有价值的大笔交易。对收购方而言，这是一个积极的公告效应，也没有显示出系统性的交易后表现不佳——消除了对顾问教唆管理帝国建立的担忧。但顾问主导的银团贷款尽管规模较大，但其贷款利差高于非顾问主导的银团贷款。顾问显然具有信息优势，但不太可能榨取租金。鉴于双重角色投标人的交易后信誉显着降低，较高的费用是合理的。顾问-贷方关于信用风险不利变化的优越信息被合理定价为双重角色利率溢价。