In this paper, we examine a manufacturer's choice of outsourcing contractor, either a competing contractor or a non-competing contractor. Both the manufacturer and the competing contractor (which also produces a product in its own brand) face customer returns. We find that the manufacturer's optimal outsourcing strategy depends strongly on two factors: the efficiency of production and sale of its brand relative to that of the competing contractor in its own brand, and the ratio of the qualities of the two brands. The competing contractor, on the other hand, always prefers to produce for the manufacturer. Interestingly, we find that when the manufacturer chooses to outsource to the non-competing contractor, both the wholesale and retail prices of the manufacturer's product decrease, while they increase if the competing contractor is chosen. In addition, the competing contractor may be chosen even if it charges a higher wholesale price than the non-competing contractor does. We find that the manufacturer and the competing contractor should offer money-back guarantees if they can efficiently recover value from any returns. We further show that when a non-competing contractor is chosen, money-back guarantees offered by the manufacturer and the competing contractor can benefit at least one firm and may even achieve a win-win situation. When the competing contractor is chosen, both the manufacturer and the competing contractor can either benefit (Pareto improvement) or suffer (prisoner's dilemma) from money-back guarantees. These results are different from those in existing studies in the literature.

在本文中，我们研究了制造商对外包承包商的选择，无论是竞争承包商还是非竞争承包商。制造商和竞争承包商（也以自己的品牌生产产品）都面临着客户退货。我们发现制造商的最优外包策略很大程度上取决于两个因素：其品牌相对于竞争承包商的自有品牌的生产和销售效率，以及两个品牌的质量比。另一方面，竞争承包商总是喜欢为制造商生产。有趣的是，我们发现当制造商选择外包给非竞争承包商时，制造商产品的批发和零售价格都下降，如果选择了竞争承包商，则它们会增加。此外，即使竞争承包商收取比非竞争承包商更高的批发价格，也可以选择竞争承包商。我们发现，如果制造商和竞争承包商能够有效地从任何退货中收回价值，他们应该提供退款保证。我们进一步表明，选择非竞争的承包商时，制造商和竞争承包商提供的退款担保可以使至少一家公司受益，甚至可以实现双赢的情况。选择竞争的承包商时，制造商和竞争承包商都可以受益（Pareto改善）或遭受退款保障（囚犯的困境）。这些结果与文献中现有研究的结果不同。即使竞争承包商收取的批发价格高于非竞争承包商，也可以选择竞争承包商。我们发现，如果制造商和竞争承包商能够有效地从任何退货中收回价值，他们应该提供退款保证。我们进一步表明，选择非竞争的承包商时，制造商和竞争承包商提供的退款担保可以使至少一家公司受益，甚至可以实现双赢的情况。选择竞争的承包商时，制造商和竞争承包商都可以受益（Pareto改善）或遭受退款保障（囚犯的困境）。这些结果与文献中现有研究的结果不同。即使竞争承包商收取的批发价格高于非竞争承包商，也可以选择竞争承包商。我们发现，如果制造商和竞争承包商能够有效地从任何退货中恢复价值，他们应该提供退款保证。我们进一步表明，选择非竞争的承包商时，制造商和竞争承包商提供的退款担保可以使至少一家公司受益，甚至可以实现双赢的情况。选择竞争的承包商时，制造商和竞争承包商都可以受益（Pareto改善）或遭受退款保障（囚犯的困境）。这些结果与文献中现有研究的结果不同。