This paper hypothesizes that the paradox Hart confesses to in Ch. X of Essays on Bentham was the result of metaethical ambivalence. Hart eclectically yokes together metaethically incompatible elements from two disparate models of “normativity of law” with different sources of normativity: the impinging model based on a cognitivist metaethic and the projectivist model based on a noncognitivist metaethic. The “sources” of normativity in the two models are different. On the impinging model the source of normativity is a reason-giving objective moral requirement, and on the projectivist model, the source of normativity is a motivationally affective conative attitude. The metaethical configuration of the rule of recognition in Essays on Bentham constrained Hart to postulate a “source” of normativity metaethically congruous with the impinging model. However, the “source” of normativity Hart seemed keen to advance—he makes an “attitude” the source of normativity—was only congruous with the projectivist model.

中文翻译：

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两个哈特的故事：边沁散文中的悖论

本文假设 Hart 在 Ch. 中承认的悖论。X of Essays on Bentham 是元伦理矛盾的结果。哈特不拘一格地将两种不同的“法律规范性”模型中的元伦理不相容元素与不同的规范性来源结合在一起：基于认知主义元伦理学的冲击模型和基于非认知主义元伦理学的投射主义模型。两种模型中规范性的“来源”是不同的。在冲击模型上，规范性的源泉是一种给予理由的客观道德要求，而在投射主义模型上，规范性的源泉是一种动机性情感的主动态度。在《边沁论文集》中承认规则的元伦理学配置迫使哈特假设规范性的“来源”在元伦理学上与冲击模型一致。