A principal faces an agent who is better informed but biased toward higher actions. She can verify the agent’s information and specify his permissible actions. We show that if the verification cost is small enough, a threshold with an escape clause (TEC) is optimal: the agent either chooses an action below a threshold or requests verification and the efficient action above the threshold. For higher costs, however, the principal may require verification only for intermediate actions, dividing the delegation set. TEC is always optimal if the principal cannot commit to inefficient allocations following the verification decision and result.

中文翻译：

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承诺与灵活性与昂贵的验证

委托人面对的代理人更了解情况但偏向于更高的行动。她可以验证代理的信息并指定其允许的操作。我们表明，如果验证成本足够小，则带有转义条款 (TEC) 的阈值是最佳的：代理要么选择低于阈值的动作，要么请求验证和高于阈值的有效动作。然而，对于更高的成本，委托人可能只需要对中间动作进行验证，从而划分委托集。如果委托人无法根据验证决定和结果进行低效分配，则 TEC 始终是最佳的。