We study a continuous-time R&D race between an established rm and a startup under asymmetric information. R&D investment brings success stochastically but only if the innovation is feasible. The only asymmetry between the rms is that the established rm has better information about the feasibility of the innovation. We show that there is an equilibrium in which the poorlyinformed startup wins more often, and has higher expected pro…ts, than the better-informed incumbent. When the informational asymmetry is large, this is the unique equilibrium outcome. The channel by which better information becomes a competitive disadvantage appears to be new— it does not stem from a negative value of information or from a second-mover advantage. Rather, it stems from the fact that better information dulls the incentive to learn from one’s rival. The research reported here was supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation (SES-1626783). We are grateful to Nageeb Ali, Gaurab Aryal, Kaustav Das, Silvana Krasteva, Erik Madsen, John Morgan, Tsz-Ning Wong and Shmuel Zamir for helpful discussions. We learnt a lot about R&D in the pharmaceutical industry from Joshua Krieger. Finally, we have greatly bene…ted from the comments of a ne set of referees. yDepartment of Economics, University of Rochester, E-mail: yuawaya@gmail.com. zDepartment of Economics, Penn State University, E-mail: vkrishna@psu.edu.

中文翻译：

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初创公司和新贵：研发中的不利信息

我们研究了在信息不对称的情况下，已建立的企业和初创企业之间的持续时间研发竞赛。研发投资随机带来成功，但前提是创新是可行的。rms 之间唯一的不对称是已建立的rm 对创新的可行性有更好的信息。我们表明，存在一个均衡，其中信息不足的初创公司比信息更丰富的在职者更常获胜，并具有更高的预期利润。当信息不对称很大时，这是唯一的均衡结果。更好的信息成为竞争劣势的渠道似乎是新的？？它不是来自信息的负面价值或来自后发优势。相反，它源于这样一个事实，即更好的信息会削弱向竞争对手学习的动力。此处报告的研究得到了美国国家科学基金会 (SES-1626783) 的资助。我们感谢 Nageeb Ali、Gaurab Aryal、Kaustav Das、Silvana Krasteva、Erik Madsen、John Morgan、Tsz-Ning Wong 和 Shmuel Zamir 的有益讨论。我们从 Joshua Krieger 那里学到了很多关于制药行业研发的知识。最后，我们从一组裁判的评论中受益匪浅。y罗切斯特大学经济系，电子邮件：yuawaya@gmail.com。z 宾夕法尼亚州立大学经济系，电子邮件：vkrishna@psu.edu。来自 Joshua Krieger 的制药行业 D。最后，我们从一组裁判的评论中受益匪浅。y罗切斯特大学经济系，电子邮件：yuawaya@gmail.com。z 宾夕法尼亚州立大学经济系，电子邮件：vkrishna@psu.edu。来自 Joshua Krieger 的制药行业 D。最后，我们从一组裁判的评论中受益匪浅。y罗切斯特大学经济系，电子邮件：yuawaya@gmail.com。z 宾夕法尼亚州立大学经济系，电子邮件：vkrishna@psu.edu。