This paper develops a two-sector, bivariate matching model, in which each sector uses a dierent dimension of skill in the production process. I show there exists a unique assignment of agents to sectors and derive comparative statics. For the symmetric case, I demonstrate that an increase in skills’ interdependence decreases talent supply and thus increases wages and wage inequality in both sectors. The main result is that if jobs are scarce, both an increase in sector one skills’ spread and a technological improvement increase the supply of talent in sector one, but decrease it in sector two. In sector two, this raises wages and wage inequality. In sector one, the eects are ambiguous in general, but wages increase for the most and decrease for the least talented agents. A weaker version of these results holds for abundant jobs.

中文翻译：

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两部门匹配模型中的供需

本文开发了一个两部门、双变量匹配模型，其中每个部门在生产过程中使用不同的技能维度。我表明存在对部门的独特分配并得出比较静态。对于对称情况，我证明技能相互依赖的增加会减少人才供应，从而增加两个部门的工资和工资不平等。主要结果是，如果工作岗位稀缺，第一部门技能传播的增加和技术进步都会增加第一部门的人才供应，但会减少第二部门的人才供应。在第二部门，这会提高工资和工资不平等。在第一部门，效果一般是模糊的，但最优秀的代理人的工资增加，最不优秀的代理人的工资减少。这些结果的较弱版本适用于丰富的工作。