Questions about the normative significance of ‘transparency’ do not receive much attention, even though they were central to Richard Moran’s (2001) original account. Instead, transparency is typically studied because of its epistemic and psychological peculiarities. In this paper, I consider three normative conceptions of transparency: teleological rationalism, procedural rationalism, and relational rationalism. The first is a theory about how transparency might relate to flourishing as a rational agent; the latter two are theories about how transparency relates to non-alienated self-knowledge. All three conceptions, I argue, face serious problems. I end the paper by suggesting where the rationalist might go from here and by highlighting the importance of focusing not on the methods but on the broader circumstances in which self-knowledge is gained or lost.

中文翻译：

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透明自知的价值

关于“透明度”的规范意义的问题并未受到太多关注，尽管它们是 Richard Moran (2001) 原始描述的核心。相反，通常研究透明度是因为它的认知和心理特性。在本文中，我考虑了透明度的三个规范性概念：目的理性主义、程序理性主义和关系理性主义。第一个是关于透明度如何与作为理性代理人的繁荣相关的理论；后两者是关于透明度如何与非异化的自我知识相关的理论。我认为，这三个概念都面临着严重的问题。