This paper discusses the licensing of technology between rival firms in a Cournot duopoly with horizontal and vertical product differentiation. The firms produce products of different qualities (high and low) and incur different costs per unit of output produced. It is shown that technology is transferred from the firm that produces the higher quality product to the firm that produces the lower quality product via a fixed-fee if the quality difference (net of cost) and the horizontal differentiation between the two products are relatively low. Technology is transferred through royalty, for any level of quality difference (net of cost), if the horizontal differentiation between the products is relatively low. A similar result is observed for two-part tariff licensing and quota licensing, which is a combination of output quota set by the licensor coupled with a fixed-fee. It is also shown that the optimal form of contract is either two-part tariff licensing or quota licensing. Technology is never licensed from the firm that produces a lower quality product to its rival that produces a higher quality product. However, the cross-licensing of technology is sometimes possible. After licensing welfare always increases.

本文讨论了具有横向和纵向产品差异的古诺双头垄断竞争公司之间的技术许可。企业生产不同质量（高品质和低品质）的产品，每单位产出产生不同的成本。结果表明，如果两种产品的质量差异（扣除成本）和横向差异相对较低，则技术会通过固定费用从生产较高质量产品的公司转移到生产较低质量产品的公司. 对于任何水平的质量差异（扣除成本），如果产品之间的横向差异相对较低，则技术通过特许权使用费转移。对于两部分关税许可和配额许可，观察到类似的结果，这是许可方设定的输出配额加上固定费用的组合。还表明，最佳合同形式是两部分关税许可或配额许可。技术永远不会从生产较低质量产品的公司授权给生产较高质量产品的竞争对手。然而，技术的交叉许可有时是可能的。发牌后福利总会增加。