ABSTRACT

Lewtas [2017] recently articulated an argument claiming that emergent conscious causal powers are impossible. In developing his argument, Lewtas makes several assumptions about emergence, phenomenal consciousness, categorical properties, and causation. We argue that there are plausible alternatives to these assumptions. Thus, the proponent of emergent conscious causal powers can escape Lewtas’s challenge.

中文翻译：

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突发的有意识的因果力量的可能性

摘要

Lewtas [2017] 最近阐明了一个论点，声称涌现的有意识的因果力量是不可能的。在发展他的论点时，Lewtas 对涌现、现象意识、分类属性和因果关系做了几个假设。我们认为这些假设存在合理的替代方案。因此，涌现的有意识的因果力量的支持者可以逃脱 Lewtas 的挑战。