Overstaffing appears to be a source of significant inefficiencies in organizations, but there is little economic theory that informs us why. We extend the canonical Lazear–Rosen tournament model to a dynamic setting that yields overstaffing at the managerial level. Overstaffing can be optimal in first best, without moral hazard, if the redundant manager gains experience and increases the firm's future productivity. In second best, overstaffing can be a way to provide incentives to young workers without “overpaying” middle-aged workers, a point that is illustrated with several examples from real world organizations. The model may offer some independent interest by integrating a generational structure into a tournament model.

中文翻译：

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太大而无法成功？公司人员过多

人员过多似乎是组织中严重低效的根源，但几乎没有经济理论可以告诉我们原因。我们将规范的 Lazear-Rosen 锦标赛模型扩展到一个动态环境，导致管理层人员过剩。如果多余的经理获得经验并提高公司未来的生产力，那么在没有道德风险的情况下，人员过剩可以是最优的。其次，人员过剩可以是一种向年轻工人提供激励的方式，而不会“多付”中年工人，现实世界组织的几个例子说明了这一点。该模型可以通过将代际结构集成到锦标赛模型中来提供一些独立的兴趣。