DESPITE THE LONG SUCCESS OF THE 1968 TREATY ON THE NONPROLIFERATION of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) regime in preventing new nuclear weapons proliferation, some commentators believe it might collapse if a nuclear breakout by a revolutionary power (e.g., Iran) leads to a proliferation cascade in the Middle East or East Asia. (1) It is feared that such a proliferation cascade would exacerbate regional insecurities and might possibly lead to regional nuclear conflict. To prevent such collapse, these commentators call for intensified diplomatic, economic, and, if necessary, military action to enforce the NPT's nonproliferation norm such as in the recently concluded (and still somewhat controversial) Iran nuclear deal. In contrast, many nuclear abolition advocates contend that the NPT regime is facing a legitimation crisis portending a different kind of regime collapse. (2) This collapse consists in the gradual and subversive capture of the NPT by its nuclear weapon states (NWS) parties, which has led to the strict and narrow enforcement of nonproliferation requirements while permitting the NWS to avoid their nuclear disarmament commitments. This capture not only reinforces the division between nuclear haves and have-nots, but it prevents an effective nuclear abolition and it undermines the view that nuclear global governance is truly characterized by the rule of international law. Under such conditions, non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) parties are ensnared in a variety of political, security, and moral dilemmas, none of which are resolved by accommodating the capture of regime governance mechanisms by the NPT NWS. In this essay, I argue that NPT regime subversion of this latter kind is legally and morally intolerable and, accordingly, the NNWS should defect en masse from the NPT. In what follows, I briefly advance the case for NPT subversion and then make a more detailed defense of the regime defection argument. The Subversion of the NPT Generally, international regimes are subverted if there is gross noncompliance of states parties that undercuts an effective implementation of regime rules, or if the states parties' common interests as expressed in treaty documents are sublimated to those of a few powerful members. Undoubtedly, the powerful few will dispute any charge of regime subversion, especially if significant disagreement persists over the meaning of controversial treaty provisions or statements. Even so, such denials alone do not rule out the possibility of regime subversion and, accordingly, such a possibility deserves to be explored. Let us note first that, alongside the NPT's nonproliferation provisions, the Preamble and Article VI express a common interest in realizing nuclear abolition. (3) Indeed, both parts suggest that nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament are not expected to happen simultaneously. Rather, nonproliferation policies arc confidence-building measures necessary for nuclear disarmament measures to succeed. (4) Second, recall that in the 1995 NPT Review Conference (RevCon)--the first one held after the Cold War's end-many NNWS demanded that the NWS reaffirm Article VI disarmament commitments in exchange for their vote to renew the NPT indefinitely. The NWS reaffirmed their commitments, but then in the next three years failed to act accordingly. In a 1998 response to this inaction, the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) of NNWS published a manifesto expressing grave alann. Then, at the 2000 NPT RevCon, the NAC secured the commitment of the NWS to a list of 13 Steps detailed as essential preconditions of nuclear abolition. (5) Tragically, after the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States, the George W. Bush administration abandoned the 13 Steps, reasserted the relevance of preventive nuclear strikes in counterterrorism operations, and began the push to modernize the US nuclear arsenal. By early 2008, one might have been forgiven for thinking that the NPT had been utterly subverted by the Bush administration. …

中文翻译：

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无核武器国家大规模背离核不扩散条约制度的道德论证

尽管 1968 年《不扩散核武器条约》（NPT）制度在防止新的核武器扩散方面取得了长期成功，但一些评论家认为，如果一个革命大国（例如伊朗）的核突破导致核扩散级联，该条约可能会崩溃。中东或东亚。(1) 担心这种级联扩散会加剧地区不安全因素，并可能导致地区核冲突。为防止这种崩溃，这些评论员呼吁加强外交、经济和必要时的军事行动，以执行 NPT 的不扩散规范，例如最近结束（但仍有争议）的伊朗核协议。相比之下，许多废除核武器的倡导者认为，NPT 制度正面临一场合法化危机，预示着另一种制度崩溃。(2) 这种崩溃在于其核武器国家 (NWS) 缔约方逐步和颠覆性地夺取 NPT，这导致严格和狭隘地执行不扩散要求，同时允许 NWS 逃避其核裁军承诺。这种捕获不仅加强了拥有核和无核之间的区别，而且阻碍了有效的核废除，并破坏了核全球治理真正以国际法规则为特征的观点。在这种情况下，无核武器国家（NNWS）政党陷入各种政治、安全和道德困境，这些都不是通过适应 NPT NWS 对政权治理机制的捕获来解决的。在本文中，我认为后一种 NPT 政权颠覆在法律和道德上都是不可容忍的，因此，NNWS 应该集体背弃 NPT。在下文中，我简要地提出了颠覆 NPT 的案例，然后对政权叛逃论点进行了更详细的辩护。颠覆NPT 一般而言，如果缔约国严重不遵守，削弱了制度规则的有效实施，或者如果条约文件中表达的缔约国共同利益升华为少数强大成员的利益，则国际制度将被颠覆。 . 毫无疑问，少数有权势的人会对任何颠覆政权的指控提出异议，特别是如果对有争议的条约规定或声明的含义仍然存在重大分歧时。即便如此，单凭这种否认并不排除颠覆政权的可能性，因此这种可能性值得探讨。首先让我们注意到，除了 NPT 的不扩散条款外，序言和第六条表达了实现废除核武器的共同利益。(3) 事实上，这两部分都表明核不扩散和裁军不会同时发生。相反，不扩散政策是核裁军措施取得成功所必需的建立信任措施。(4) 其次，回想一下在 1995 年的 NPT 审议大会（RevCon）——冷战后举行的第一次' 许多 NNWS 要求 NWS 重申第六条裁军承诺，以换取他们对无限期延长 NPT 的投票。国家气象局重申了他们的承诺，但在接下来的三年中没有采取相应的行动。在 1998 年对这种不作为的回应中，NNWS 的新议程联盟 (NAC) 发表了一份宣言，表达了严重的艾伦。然后，在 2000 年 NPT RevCon 上，NAC 确保了 NWS 对 13 个步骤清单的承诺，详细说明了废除核武器的必要先决条件。(5) 可悲的是，在9月11日对美国的恐怖袭击之后，乔治·W·布什政府放弃了13个步骤，重申预防性核打击在反恐行动中的重要性，并开始推动美国核武库的现代化。到 2008 年初，有人认为 NPT 已被布什政府彻底颠覆，这可能是可以原谅的。…