ABSTRACT

Typically, nudging is a technique for steering the choices of people without giving reasons or using enforcement. In benevolent cases, it is used when people are insufficiently responsive to reason. The nudger triggers automatic cognitive mechanisms – sometimes even biases – in smart ways in order to push irrational people in the right direction. Interestingly, this technique can also be applied to doxastic attitudes. Someone who is doxastically unresponsive to evidence can be nudged into forming true beliefs or doxastic attitudes that are propositionally justified. When doxastic nudging uses non-rational mechanisms, the worry is that nudging cannot result in justified beliefs or knowledge, as the resulting doxastic attitudes lack the right kind of basis. In this paper, I will argue that given the right background views about knowledge, justified beliefs and the relevant processes, epistemic nudging is possible even in these cases. That is, all kinds of nudging can – in appropriate circumstances – produce justified beliefs or knowledge in the nudgee.

摘要

通常，助推是一种在不给出理由或不强制执行的情况下引导人们做出选择的技术。在仁慈的情况下，当人们对理性反应不足时使用它。助推器以巧妙的方式触发自动认知机制——有时甚至是偏见——以将非理性的人推向正确的方向。有趣的是，这种技术也可以应用于信念态度. 可以促使对证据毫无反应的人形成真正的信念或命题证明的信念态度。当信念助推使用非理性机制时，令人担忧的是助推无法产生合理的信念或知识，因为由此产生的信念态度缺乏正确的基础。在本文中，我将论证，如果对知识、正当信念和相关过程有正确的背景看法，即使在这些情况下，认知助推也是可能的。也就是说，在适当的情况下，各种助推都可以在助推者中产生合理的信念或知识。