This paper establishes existence of subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies for a general class of sequential multi-lateral bargaining games, without assuming a stationary setting. The only required hypothesis is that utility functions are continuous on the space of economic outcomes. In particular, no assumption on the space of feasible payoffs is needed. The result covers arbitrary and even time-varying bargaining protocols (acceptance rules), externalities, and other-regarding preferences. As a side result, we clarify the meaning of assumptions on “continuity at infinity.”

中文翻译：

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没有平稳性的多边战略谈判

本文在不假设固定设置的情况下，为一般类别的顺序多边讨价还价博弈建立了纯策略中子博弈完美均衡的存在性。唯一需要的假设是效用函数在经济结果空间上是连续的。特别是，不需要对可行支付空间的假设。结果涵盖了任意甚至随时间变化的谈判协议（接受规则）、外部性和其他方面的偏好。作为附带结果，我们澄清了“无穷大连续性”假设的含义。