We study how the existence of important production contracts affects the choice of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation contracts. We hypothesize that having major customers raises the costs associated with CEO risk-taking incentives and leads to lower option-based compensation. Using industry-level import tariff reductions as exogenous shocks to customer relationships, we find that firms with major customers subsequently reduce CEO option-based compensation significantly. We also show that continued high option compensation following tariff cuts is associated with significant declines in these relationships and supplier firm performance. Our study provides new insights into how important stakeholders shape executive compensation decisions.

我们研究了重要生产合同的存在如何影响首席执行官 (CEO) 薪酬合同的选择。我们假设拥有主要客户会增加与 CEO 冒险激励相关的成本，并导致基于期权的薪酬降低。使用行业层面的进口关税削减作为对客户关系的外生冲击，我们发现拥有主要客户的公司随后显着降低了基于 CEO 的期权薪酬。我们还表明，关税削减后持续高额的期权补偿与这些关系和供应商公司业绩的显着下降有关。我们的研究为利益相关者如何影响高管薪酬决策提供了新的见解。