This study examines the government policy of public goods provision and its effects on economic growth and welfare under intergenerational altruism. The study considers an endogenous growth model with altruistic overlapping generations. The preferences of the current youth exhibit a future bias, and thus, democratically elected governments are subject to this future bias. The optimal rule for the supply of public goods under future bias differs from the original Samuelson rule. Unlike the standard growth model without any bias, under the optimal rule, the equilibrium growth rate is not independent of government size. Future bias gives young generations the dynamic incentives to invest more. With future bias, the intergenerational redistributive effects of public goods stimulate such incentives under certain conditions. Hence, the government size affects the economic growth through intertemporal changes in their resource allocations. Moreover, the growth effect of the government size provides nontrivial outcomes of welfare analysis. Our numerical analyses show the growth and welfare superiority of the democratic governments to the nonbiased social planner.

本研究考察了代际利他主义下政府提供公共产品的政策及其对经济增长和福利的影响。该研究考虑了具有利他性重叠世代的内生增长模型。当前青年的偏好表现出对未来的偏见，因此，民选政府受到这种未来偏见的影响。未来偏差下公共物品供给的最优规则不同于原来的萨缪尔森规则。与没有任何偏差的标准增长模型不同，在最优规则下，均衡增长率与政府规模无关。未来偏见为年轻一代提供了更多投资的动力。由于未来偏差，公共产品的代际再分配效应在特定条件下刺激了这种激励。因此，政府规模通过其资源配置的跨期变化影响经济增长。此外，政府规模的增长效应提供了福利分析的重要结果。我们的数值分析显示了民主政府对无偏见的社会计划者的增长和福利优势。