This article argues that the requirement of group disadvantage in indirect belief discrimination is incompatible with the human right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. The latter protects sincerely held beliefs even if they are not shared by others or part of group orthodoxy. Consequently, the group disadvantage requirement in indirect belief discrimination ought to be interpreted away under section 3 HRA. Doing so, it is argued, does not give an unfair advantage to beliefs over other aspects of personal identity and complies with the legal injunction against judicial involvement in theological or philosophical disputes. The article concludes by arguing that, in light of the UK case law, imposing a requirement of group disadvantage is likely to pose a more significant barrier to secular philosophical beliefs than to religious ones. In light of an understanding of secularism that requires equal treatment of religious and deeply held secular beliefs, it is imperative that such a barrier be dispensed with.

中文翻译：

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保护个人信仰免受间接歧视

本文认为，间接信仰歧视中的群体劣势要求与思想、良心和宗教自由的人权不相容。后者保护真诚持有的信仰，即使它们不被其他人或团体正统观念的一部分所共享。因此，间接信仰歧视中的群体劣势要求应该根据 HRA 第 3 节进行解释。有人认为，这样做不会使信仰比个人身份的其他方面具有不公平的优势，并且符合禁止司法介入神学或哲学争议的法律禁令。文章最后指出，根据英国判例法，强加群体不利条件的要求可能比宗教信仰对世俗哲学信仰构成更大的障碍。