Several argue that truth cannot be science’s sole epistemic goal, for it would fail to do justice to several scientific practices that advance understanding. I challenge these arguments but only after making a small concession: science’s sole epistemic goal is not truth as such; rather, its goal is finding true answers to relevant questions. Using examples from the natural and social sciences, I then show that scientific understanding’s epistemically valuable features are either true answers to relevant questions or a means thereof.

中文翻译：

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理解、真理和认知目标

一些人争辩说，真理不能是科学唯一的认知目标，因为它不能公正地对待促进理解的几种科学实践。我挑战这些论点，但只是在做出小小的让步之后：科学的唯一认知目标不是真理本身；相反，它的目标是找到相关问题的真正答案。使用自然科学和社会科学的例子，我然后表明科学理解的认识论价值特征要么是对相关问题的真实答案，要么是其手段。