Cross-border banking presents a unique set of challenges in the EU from the perspective of arranging administrative oversight structures. Structuring cooperation between different EU and national authorities in a way which is conducive to trust-building and mutual engagement is an essential condition for overcoming disintegrative tendencies in the internal market. To assess how the existing EU arrangements fare in this regard in the context of EU resolution law, this article comparatively analyses the different models of multilevel administrative cooperation in the post-crisis EU framework. These are specifically the centralised model of the European Banking Union (Single Resolution Mechanism) and the relatively looser networked model of the resolution colleges. The multilevel cooperation under both models is nuanced given the distinct roles of the national resolution authorities, EU agencies and the differentiated status of non-euro area Member States in the EBU (Croatia, Bulgaria). The article’s findings allow to identify specific problems of constitutional nature pertaining to the accountability of administrative cooperation, equality of Member States and the implications of Meroni doctrine’s distortive effects.

从安排行政监督结构的角度来看，跨境银行业务在欧盟提出了一系列独特的挑战。以有利于建立信任和相互参与的方式构建不同欧盟和国家当局之间的合作是克服内部市场瓦解趋势的必要条件。为了评估在欧盟决议法背景下现有的欧盟安排在这方面的表现如何，本文比较分析了危机后欧盟框架中多层次行政合作的不同模式。这些具体是欧洲银行联盟的集中模式（单一决议机制）和决议学院相对松散的网络模式。鉴于国家决议机构、欧盟机构的不同角色以及非欧元区成员国在 EBU（克罗地亚、保加利亚）中的不同地位，两种模式下的多层次合作是微妙的。该文章的调查结果允许确定与行政合作问责制、会员国平等和行政合作的影响有关的宪法性质的具体问题。梅罗尼教义的扭曲效果。